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1. Introduction 
Organized crime is a worldwide, widespread phenomenon, which affects developing as 
well as developed countries, and entails deep economic and social consequences. According to 
The  Economist  (2009),  the  Japanese  Yakuza  “[...]  is  estimated to  haul  in  as  much as  2 
trillion Yen (around 21 billion US dollar) annually”. Italian mafia’s activities amounted to 
7%  of  GDP  in  Italy  in  2007  and  crime  business  flourishes  even  during  economic  crisis 
periods. In 2009, while Italy’s GDP fell by 5%, organized crime increased in turnover terms 
by 3.7% (Financial Times, 2010). As Allum and Sieber (2003) point out, organized crime has 
become highly pervasive and fully integrated in everyday socio-economic and political life. 
The BBC (2000) reports that “organized crime controls 1 in 5 businesses in Italy”.
1 Similarly, 
in  1998,  the  Russian  government  estimates  that  the  Russian  mafiya  controlled  40%  of 
private business and 60% of state-owned companies”.
2  
The purpose of this study is to enhance our understanding of organized crime activities. 
Is organized crime able to divert and grab public transfers? By using an innovative dataset 
on crime at municipality level, this study tests whether firms located in municipalities with 
more mafia-related crimes obtain more public subsidies. The empirical evidence refers to the 
Italian mafia. The Italian case is a suitable environment for this study for three reasons. 
First, Italian mafia, like other types of organized crime such as the Japanese Yakuza, is 
rooted in the political and socio-economic life and its origins can be traced back to the XIX 
century. Second, among developed countries, Italy is one of the most mafia-ridden countries, 
as organized crime is diffusely present in at least 5 of the 20 Italian regions. Third, it raises a 
relevant policy question: how can a government prevent that public funding aimed to lagging 
areas is diverted by organized crime? This policy issue is also relevant for other countries, 
such as Russia and Colombia, where the presence of organized crime interferes and impedes 
the government’s ability to govern (Godson and Williams, 1998; Allum and Siebert, 2003). 
More generally, our results indicate that the design of geographically targeted aid policies 
should be supported by detailed analysis of local crime activities.  
In accordance with the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2004), 
organized crime is defined as a “[...] structured group of three or more persons, existing for a 
period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes 
or offences [...] in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”.  
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We focus on the allocation of public transfers to firms at municipality level, with the aim 
of  testing  whether  mafia  can  determine  funding  allocation.  The  presence  of  mafia  is 
measured using an innovative data set made available by the Italian Ministry of Justice, 
which provides detailed information on crime at municipality level, by article of the Italian 
Penal Code. We test the impact of mafia on public transfers, measured by the amount of 
funds transferred to firms according to Law 488/92. These funds have been for many years 
the main policy instrument for reducing territorial disparities in Italy, by offering a subsidy 
to firms willing to invest in lagging areas.  
In order to deal with the endogeneity of the relationship between mafia presence and 
funds’ allocation, we explore the origins of mafia. Gambetta (1993) defines mafia as “[...] an 
industry  that  produces,  promotes  and  sells  private  protection”.  Private  protection  was 
historically needed in Sicily for two main reasons: First, starting from 1812, a number of 
anti-feudal laws slowly favoured the opening up of the market for land, thus leading to an 
increase in the number of landowners. Second, in the wake of the new Italian State, a lack of 
property rights protection, together with a vacuum of power, allowed the emergence of mafia 
as a land protection industry. Bandiera (2003) provides evidence that land fragmentation, 
which followed the end of feudalism, propped up mafia activity through an increase in the 
demand for property right protection. Assuming that the supply of protection is elastic, we 
expect that in equilibrium mafia was more likely to emerge in areas where the value of land 
was higher. Therefore, we instrument current mafia activity with exogenous historical and 
geographical shifters of land productivity, i.e. rainfall in the XIX century and geographical 
features at municipality level.  
We provide evidence that the presence of mafia affects the allocation of public transfers: 
firms located in municipalities with mafia activity receive larger public funding. According to 
our estimates, mafia averted about 35% of the total amount of public transfers on average 
over the period 2004-2009. The estimated impact of mafia is also economically relevant and 
equals  one  standard  deviation  of  the  dependent  variable.  A  series  of  robustness  checks 
confirms  these  findings.  The  results  are  robust  to  alternative  econometric  specifications, 
different measures of mafia, and diverse estimation methods. We also provide evidence that 
the findings hold when we take into account the potential issue of weak instruments.  
Moreover,  we  propose  two  falsification  tests.  First,  we  test  whether  the  positive 
relationship between mafia and public transfers is due to a more generous attitude of the 
State  towards  areas  with  mafia  presence.  We  show  that,  if  anything,  these  areas  are 
underfunded, relative to those where mafia is absent. Second, we test whether crime culture, 4 
 
rather than mafia, has an effect on funds’ allocation. We do not find any evidence that other 
types of crime influence the allocation of public funds.  
So far, we have implicitly assumed that mafia’ control over public transfers’ allocation is 
inefficient. But does it really matter if funds’ allocation is positively related to mafia? We 
provide indirect and direct evidence that investment is more likely to be unproductive and 
corruption in the public administration to be greater where mafia is present.  
 
Our study is related to four strands of literature. First, it contributes to the emerging 
literature analyzing the economic consequences of organized crime. A study by Pinotti (2011) 
estimates the spread of organized crime in Italy. Using a methodology introduced by Abadie 
et al. (2003) for the Basque conflict, Pinotti compares Southern Italian regions on the basis 
of the dynamics and historical roots of the different organized crime groups. According to his 
analysis, organized crime is responsible for a 16% loss in GDP over a 30 year period. In a 
recent study, Bonaccorsi di Patti (2009) provides evidence that crime adversely affects access 
to credit. Borrowers in high-crime areas are found to pay higher interest rates, pledge more 
collateral, and resort less to asset-backed loans and more to revolving credit lines.  
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on governance and economic outcomes. 
Kaufman and Kray (2002) consider the role of governance in explaining economic outcomes 
and provide evidence of a positive relationship between governance and per capita income; 
whilst Kaufmann (2004) highlights that many countries experience a “governance deficit” 
which does not allow them to support their growth paths. Hall and Jones (1999) look at the 
role of social infrastructures,  i.e. institutions and government policies, instrumented with 
geography and languages, on output per worker. Along these lines, Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2002) show that settlers’ mortality can explain expropriation laws, which have an 
impact on economic performance. The rationale behind this finding is that institutions set-up 
by the Europeans were mainly extractive in areas where settlers’ mortality was larger.  
Third, this paper is linked to the recent literature analyzing the effect of an increase in 
the availability of public funds on governance and the spread of organized crime. Brollo et 
al. (2010) study the impact of larger federal transfer in Brazil on political corruption and on 
the  quality  of  the  candidates.  They  consider  a  career  concern  model  with  endogenous 
candidate selection and provide empirical evidence that larger transfers induce an increase in 
corruption, while reducing the quality of the political candidates. Gennaioli et al. (2011) 
analyze the impact of public transfers on the spread of organized crime. The authors use 
Italian data for crime conviction and evaluate the spread of organized crime caused by an 
increase in public funding which followed an earthquake that hit two regions in the centre of 5 
 
Italy in 1997. Both studies look at the impact of public transfers on the spread of organized 
crime. We view our analysis as complementary to these studies. The purpose of the present 
work is to analyze how established organized crime, such as Italian mafia, Japanese Yakuza 
or Chinese Triads, can affect the allocation of public transfers.  
Finally, as far as the instrumental variable strategy is concerned, this work is related to 
two papers that study the historical origins of Sicilian mafia. Both of them follow Gambetta 
(1993)’s original view according to which mafia emerges in the last part of the 19
th century 
as  an  industry  for  private  protection.  Bandiera  (2003)  empirically  support  this  idea  by 
showing that mafia was more likely to be active in towns where land was more divided; 
Buonanno et al (2011) document that areas characterized by the most valuable export goods 
(sulphur and citrus fruits) were also more affected by mafia.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study analyzing the causal impact of mafia 
on  public  transfers’  allocation  and  to  uncover  one  of  the  mechanisms  through  which 
organized crime affects the economy. By grabbing public funds assigned to lagging areas, 
organized crime effectively undermines growth, investment and development. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical model. Section 3 
presents a brief history of mafia and identifies the exogenous determinants of mafia which 
will be used in the instrumental variable analysis, while Section 4 describes the data. Section 
5 presents the results. Robustness of the results is explored in Section 6. Section 7 presents 
further interpretation of the results. Finally, Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. 2. 2. 2. The empirical model The empirical model The empirical model The empirical model       
 
In this section we outline the empirical framework and discuss the identification strategy 
that we adopt. First, we estimate a simple model of the relationship between public funds 
and mafia presence. The econometric specification reads as follows:  
 
1 2 i i i Public funds mafia α α ε = + + + i   X' β       (1)       
where the variable Public fundsi measures the total amount of public funds per employee 
assigned to firms located in municipality i in the period 2004-2009. The indicator variable 
mafiai takes the value 1 if municipality i experienced a mafia-related crime in the same 
period  and  0  otherwise;  while  X X X Xi i i i  is  the  vector  of  controls.  In  order  to  account  for 
heterogeneity  across  municipalities,  we  control  for  the  degree  of  economic  development, 
measured by the unemployment rate at municipality level; sector composition, evaluated by 6 
 
the industry share; population density and social capital. The impact of organized crime on 
public funding as specified above may suffer from endogeneity on three grounds. First, the 
identification of the impact of mafia on public transfers may suffer from reverse causality: 
public funds may feed into the expansion of organized crime. This should lead to an upward 
bias. Second, our measure of mafia may suffer from measurement error. The dummy variable 
mafia is constructed using reports of mafia activity to the Police. As pointed out by Pinotti 
(2011), underreporting is likely to be greater in municipalities with mafia presence due to 
omertà or fear of mafia’s retaliation. Third, the econometric specification may suffer from 
omitted variables: this is potentially very relevant with cross-sectional data, as in our case. 
The direction of the bias related to the latter two sources of endogeneity is undetermined. In 
order to overcome these three issues problem, we adopt an instrumental variable approach 
and, in search for valid instruments, we revert to the origins of mafia. 
 
3. 3. 3. 3.       In search of valid instruments: a b In search of valid instruments: a b In search of valid instruments: a b In search of valid instruments: a brief history of mafia rief history of mafia rief history of mafia rief history of mafia       
 
According to a rather consolidated view, mafia emerged in the second half of 1800 in 
Sicily, during the transition from the Borbone dynasty and the emergence of the unified Italy 
(1861).  In  his  1993  book,  Gambetta  defines  mafia  as  “[...]  an  industry  that  produces, 
promotes and sells private protection” (page 1). According to the author, the demand for 
private protection arises from two main motives: an endemic distrust and the vacuum of 
power that followed Italian unification. This endemic lack of trust can be considered as a 
legacy of the Spanish domination, characterized by a divide et impera strategy. Under the 
Spaniard dominion, commerce and the accumulation of wealth were dampened, superstition 
was encouraged, and a society based on a strict hierarchy was promoted, while public trust 
was replaced by private trust (Gambetta, 2000). Already in 1814, Alexander de Tocqueville 
during  his  journey  to  Sicily  remarks  the  lack  of  trust  among  the  Sicilian  community 
(Gambetta, 2000). In his seminal work on social capital, Putnam (1993) supports the view 
that different levels of social capital between the North and the South of Italy are rooted in 
the historical heritage of the two areas.
3  
The end of Feudalism is the second motive for the increase in the demand for private 
protection. Starting from 1812, the market for land was opened up and a number of anti-
feudal laws slowly favoured the increase in the number of landowners. Between 1812, the end 
                                                           
3 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) provide extensive empirical evidence of the long lasting effect of 
social capital in the Centre and North of Italy. 7 
 
of  the  feudalism,  and  1861,  the  year  of  Italian  unification,  the  number  of  landowners 
increased from 2,000 to 20,000 (Gambetta, 1993). This number probably increased even more 
rapidly in the subsequent years because of the sale of parts of land and tenements belonging 
to the Vatican State ("Liquidazione dell'Asse Ecclesiastico", 1867). Given the absence of 
settlements in the countryside and the lack of property rights legislation, protection was 
needed to defend the newly acquired plots. At the same time, in the wake of the new Italian 
State, a vacuum of power allowed the emergence of mafia as a land protection industry. 
Therefore, the armed guards which had provided their protection to latifondisti could expand 
their activity by providing their service to small land owners. As early as 1875 the issue of 
mafia was acknowledged by the newborn Italian Parliament, which mandated the Bonfadini 
Inquiry. According to the Bonfadini Inquiry, “[...] where wages are low and peasant life is less 
comfortable, [...], there are no symptoms of mafia [...]. By contrast, [...] where property is 
divided, where there is plenty of work for everyone, and the orange trees enrich landowners 
and growers alike — these are the typical sites of mafia influence.”
4  
 
In this context, the value of land appears to be one of the main determinants of the 
demand for protection. If the supply of protection is elastic, we expect that in equilibrium 
mafia emerged in areas where the value of land was higher. Therefore, our set of instruments 
for current mafia activity includes rainfall in the decade before 1861 (the year of Italian 
Unification),  together  with  historical  and  geographical  shifters  of  land  productivity: 
population density in 1861, slope and altitude at municipality level. We do not have a prior 
over the expected sign of the rainfall variables on current mafia presence. First, the optimal 
quantity of water depends on the crop type. Second, agriculture economists agree that the 
effect  of  rainfall  on  the  farm  values  is  not  monotonic  (e.g.  Mendelsohn  et  al.  1994; 
Kurukulasuriya and Mendelsohn 2007). Third, historians claim that mafia controlled water 
wells (e.g. Santino 2002): as far as water wells are concentred in areas with less rainfall 
(where the wells’ smoothing role is more important), we could expect a negative association 
between rainfall and the presence of mafia. Overall, we include in our first stage regression 
rainfall and its squared value to capture the indeterminateness the sign. On the other hand, 
we expect that the altitude and slope should exert a negative effect of the land value, while 
the sign of the population density is undefined on a priori ground.  
Besides  offering  statistical  evidence  about  instrumental  variables’  exogeneity,  we  also 
argue that land value in the second half of the 19
th century is unlikely to affect local current 
economic conditions because (i) even if the spatial distribution of rainfall is time-persistent, 
                                                           
4 Gambetta (1993). 8 
 
modern and mechanized agriculture is much less dependent on rainfall and (ii) the current 
role of agriculture in the economy is very small: according to the Italian National Statistics 





The first source of data is an innovative data set made available by the Italian Ministry 
of  Justice  (Ministero  della  Giustizia),  which  provides  detailed  information  on  crime  at 
municipality level, by article of the Italian Penal Code (Codice penale). The dummy variable 
mafia takes the value 1 if a mafia-related crime, defined by the article 416-bis of the Penal 
Code,  was  reported  over  the  period  2004-2009,  augmented  with  official  data  from  the 
Minister  of  Interior  (Ministero  degli  Interni)  on  whether  the  municipality  council  was 
dissolved due to mafia infiltration. About 16% of the municipalities in Sicily experienced at 
least  one  mafia-association  episode  between  2004  and  2009.  Article  416-bis  defines  an 
association as being of Mafia-type nature “when those belonging to the association exploit 
the potential for intimidation which their membership gives them, and the compliance and 
omertà which membership entails and which lead to the committing of crimes, the direct or 
indirect  assumption  of  management  or  control  of  financial  activities,  concessions, 
permissions, enterprises and public services for the purpose of deriving profit or wrongful 
advantages for themselves or others”. 
 
Our analysis makes use of disaggregated information on public transfers at municipality 
level. As a measure of public transfers, we employ the official Law 488/92 data set provided 
by the Italian Ministry of Industry, which regulates the issuance of project-related capital 
grants. The Law 488/92 funds have been used as the main policy instrument for reducing 
territorial disparities in Italy, by offering a subsidy to firms willing to invest in lagging areas. 
Funds  are  assigned  on  the  basis  of  five  criteria:  matching  funds;  number  of  jobs  as 
percentage of the investment; value of assistance; score related to the priorities in terms of 
location, sector and project type at regional level; score related to the environmental impact. 
The investment can be used for the following motives: relocation, modernization, setting-up, 
extension, restructuring, reactivation and reconversion (Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006).
6 The 
                                                           
5 Istat, Italia in cifre 2011.(http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/30329).  
6  The  Law  488/92  requires  that  the  winning  firms  receive  the  first  annual  investment  within  2 
months. The amounts are paid out in three equal instalments. The second and the third instalment 
are paid on the same date in subsequent years. 9 
 
data set contains micro data on each funding application. We aggregate the amount of funds 
assigned to firms located in each municipality during the period 2003-2009 according to the 
Law 488/92, normalized by the total number of employees in the same municipality. Table 1 
reports  the  summary  statistics.  The  mean  amount  of  public  funds  across  the  390 
municipalities is € 584 per employee, and about 49% of the municipalities did not receive 
any funding over the period considered. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics Table 1: Summary statistics Table 1: Summary statistics Table 1: Summary statistics       
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The upper panel of Table 1 also reports basic features at municipality level, such as 
unemployment rate, population density, a measure of social capital and industry share. The 
unemployment  rate variable  and  population  density  are  measured  according  to  the  2001 
Italian Census by ISTAT, while the share of industry, the measure of social capital and the 
unemployment  rate  at  municipality  level  arise  from  the  2001  Census  of  Italian  firms 
conducted by ISTAT. The mean unemployment rate across the 390 municipalities is around 
25%,  with  a  maximum  value  of  49%  reached  in  Giuliana,  a  municipality located  in  the 10 
 
province of the Sicilian capital, Palermo. Following Putnam (1993) and Guiso et al. (2008), 
we measure social capital as the percentage of employees in the non-profit sector over the 
total number of employees in 2001.
7  
 
Data on rainfall in the XIX century are taken from the European Seasonal Temperature 
and Precipitation Reconstruction database. Rainfall data are reconstructed on the basis of 
paleoclimate  proxies  such  as  tree  ring  chronologies,  ice  cores,  corals,  a  speleothem,  and 
documental  evidence  (Pauling,  Luterbacher,  Casty,  Wanner,  2006).  Data  on  seasonal 
precipitation  are  available  for  Europe  for  the  period  1500-1900  at  a  0.5°  x  0.5°  grid 
resolution.  Each  Sicilian  municipality  is  mapped  into  a  cell  by  minimizing  the  distance 
between the capital city of the municipality and the centre of the cell. We map the 390 
Sicilian municipalities into 25 different cells (15.6 municipalities per cell on average). The 
lower panel of Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the rainfall variable.  
The  lower  panel  of  Table  1  also  reports  the  slope  and  altitude  of  each  municipality 
capital according to ISTAT and the municipality’s population density in the year of Italian 
Unification, as of the first ISTAT Census in December 1861.  
 
Table 2 presents the results of a simple exercise. We split the municipalities between 
those which experienced mafia-related crimes and those which did not. The median amount 
of  funds  is  greater in municipalities  which  experienced mafia-related crime in  the  period 
considered,  than  in  municipalities  which  did  not  witness  any  mafia-related  crime.  The 
difference between the medians is statistically different at the 5% level. This first result is 
consistent with the idea of a positive relationship between public funds and mafia.  
 
Table 2: Public funds by mafia presence Table 2: Public funds by mafia presence Table 2: Public funds by mafia presence Table 2: Public funds by mafia presence 
  Mafia = 0 
(1) 
Mafia = 1 
(2) 
Difference  
(2) — (1) 
       
Public Funds  0.000  0.187  0.187** 
  (327 obs.)  (63 obs.)   
       
** significant at 5%.       
   
                                                           
7 Results hold when using an alternative measure of social capital, i.e. voter participation.  11 
 
5. 5. 5. 5. Empirical results Empirical results Empirical results Empirical results       
 
5.1 OLS results 5.1 OLS results 5.1 OLS results 5.1 OLS results       
First, we investigate the impact of mafia presence on public funds using simple OLS 
estimation. As outlined in Section 2, we always include the unemployment rate and the 
share of industry at municipality level among our control variables. The indicator variable 
mafia is never statistically significant and the estimation results are not affected when we 
control for population density (column 2 and 4) and social capital (column 3 and 4). 
 
Table  Table  Table  Table 3: Public funds and mafia  3: Public funds and mafia  3: Public funds and mafia  3: Public funds and mafia — — — —       OLS estimates OLS estimates OLS estimates OLS estimates       
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Public funds 
         
Mafia  0.010  0.018  0.016  0.024 
  (0.149)  (0.149)  (0.148)  (0.149) 
         
Unemployment   -2.854***  -2.843***  -2.889***  -2.877*** 
Rate  (0.977)  (0.977)  (0.977)  (0.977) 
         
Industry share  2.855***  2.855***  2.822***  2.823*** 
  (0.877)  (0.877)  (0.880)  (0.880) 
         
Population     -0.054    -0.050 
density    (0.044)    (0.044) 
         
Social Capital      -1.597  -1.555 
      (1.618)  (1.624) 
         
Observations  390  390  389  389 
R-squared  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
 
 
5.1  5.1  5.1  5.1 Instrumental variable analysis Instrumental variable analysis Instrumental variable analysis Instrumental variable analysis       
As discussed in Section 2, the OLS analysis presented in the previous subsection might 
suffer from endogeneity on three grounds: measurement error, reverse causality and omitted 
variable. To this end, we instrument the variable mafia. Table 4 presents the estimation 
results for the 2SLS analysis. The excluded instruments are average rainfall in the period 
preceding  Italian  Unification  (1850-1861),  rainfall  squared,  altitude,  slope  and  population 
density in 1861. Exogeneity of our instruments may not hold if past rainfall shapes public 
transfers through other channels different from mafia. This would invalidate the exclusion 12 
 
restriction assumption. We argue that even in the presence of time correlations of rainfall, 
exogeneity relies on the fact that modern agriculture is less sensitive to weather conditions, 
whilst economic development is less dependent on agriculture. Also, by including the set of 
controls X X X Xi i i i we take into account for other possible transmission channels.
8 Besides, given our 
overidentified model, we can test for overidentification restrictions. Regarding the relevance 
of  our  instruments,  on  a  priori  grounds,  rainfall  and  geographical  characteristics  shaped 
crops and agricultural output before agricultural mechanization (Mendelsohn et al. 1994).  
Column 1 reports the estimates of the basic 2SLS specification. The excluded instruments 
are jointly statistically significant and the F-test of exclusion restriction is equal to 12.9, 
while  the  test  of  overidentified  restrictions  does  not  cast  doubt  on  the  validity  of  the 
instrument.  Mafia  has  a  positive  and  statistically  significant  impact  on  public  transfers. 
These results hold also when we control for additional regressors, such as population density 
(columns 2 and 4), and social capital, as measured by the percentage of employees in the 
not-for-profit sector (columns 3 and 4). According to these results, the presence of mafia 
manages to attract almost 3.5 million euro of public funds on average.
9 The economic effect 
is  economically  relevant:  it  adds  up  to  about  one  standard  deviation  of  the  dependent 
variable. Our estimates show that the presence of mafia increases the total amount of funds 
by  about  35%.  We  have  undertaken a  series  of  robustness  checks  by varying  the  set  of 
control variables to include human capital (measured by the number of college graduates) at 
municipality level and employment share by two-digit sector. The overall explicative power 
of these alternative specifications (not reported here to save space) does not outperform the 
more parsimonious representation shown in Table 4.
 10 
   
                                                           
8 For instance, Durante (2010) shows that variability in precipitation stimulates higher level of trust. 
This,  in  turn,  might  influence  funds  allocation  so  invalidating  our  identification  strategy. 
Unfortunately, trust is not available at the municipality level but we can control for another well-
celebrated measure of social capital that is share of employees in the no profit sector. 
9 Note that these calculations are obtained by multiplying the value in Column 4 of Table 4 by the 
average number of employees and by further multiplying by 1,000. 
10 Clustering standard errors at province level or rainfall cell level does not affect the results either. 
The details of the robustness checks are available from the authors upon request. 13 
 
 
Table 4: Public funds and mafia  Table 4: Public funds and mafia  Table 4: Public funds and mafia  Table 4: Public funds and mafia — — — —       IV analysis IV analysis IV analysis IV analysis       
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
  Second stage Second stage Second stage Second stage       
  Public funds 
Mafia  1.151**  1.247**  1.196**  1.292*** 
  (0.466)  (0.496)  (0.471)  (0.500) 
         
Unemployment   -3.546***  -3.567***  -3.629***  -3.649*** 
rate  (0.954)  (0.960)  (0.951)  (0.958) 
         
Industry share  2.752***  2.746***  2.712***  2.708*** 
  (0.924)  (0.926)  (0.928)  (0.930) 
         
Population density    -0.123*    -0.121* 
    (0.071)    (0.071) 
         
Social capital      -2.227  -2.167 
      (1.729)  (1.735) 
         
        First stage First stage First stage First stage       
  Mafia 
Rainfall 1850-61  -0.019***  -0.019***  -0.019***  -0.019*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
         
Rainfall 1850-61  0.015***  0.015***  0.015***  0.015*** 
Squared  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
         
Slope  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
         
Altitude  -0.207***  -0.201***  -0.208***  -0.204*** 
  (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.066)  (0.067) 
         
Population density  0.271*  0.231  0.268*  0.234 
1861  (0.150)  (0.169)  (0.149)  (0.169) 
         










         
First stage F  12.9378  11.9703  12.7537  11.8269 
         
Shea Par. R2  0.1639  0.1566  0.1622  0.1552 
Observations  390  390  389  389 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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6. 6. 6. 6. Robustness checks Robustness checks Robustness checks Robustness checks       
In  this  section  we  present  a  series  of  robustness  checks.  We  start  by  considering 
alternative econometric specifications. Then we use alternative measures of mafia to take 
into account the number of mafia-related crimes within each municipality. Next, we consider 
different estimation methods, namely GMM estimation and Heckman selection models. We 
provide evidence that the results hold also when we take into account the potential issue of 
weak instruments. 
 
6 6 6 6.1 Alternative econometric specifications .1 Alternative econometric specifications .1 Alternative econometric specifications .1 Alternative econometric specifications       
Table 5 presents the results of an alternative set of specifications. In columns 1 and 2 we 
report the estimated coefficients of an econometric specification which adds province fixed 
effects (9 provinces) to the specification presented in Table 4. The impact of mafia on public 
transfers is still statistically significant at the 5% level. Columns 3 and 4 present the results 
for an econometric specification in which we control for Local Labor market (LLM) fixed 
effects. Local Labor markets are defined on the basis of commuting distances according to 
the 2001 ISTAT Census. There are 77 Local Labor markets in Sicily, with an average of 5 
municipalities per local labor market. The estimated coefficient on mafia is still positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Finally, columns 5 and 6 present the results of a specification in which we address the 
possibility that our findings are biased because of spatial correlation. If mafia is spatially 
correlated, we would expect crime spillovers across municipalities. Neglecting these spillovers 
would entail an omitted variable bias. The LLM fixed effect specification partially addresses 
this issue. In order to fully address this issue, we include as a control the variable mafia-
neighbori  that  takes  the  value  1  if  a  mafia-related  episode  has  been  registered  in  any 
municipality  (other  than  i)  belonging  to  the  local  labor  market  of  municipality  i.  The 
estimated coefficient of mafia is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, while 
the measure of spatial correlation does not appear to be statistically significant.  
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Table 5: Instrumental variable analysis. Alternative specifications  Table 5: Instrumental variable analysis. Alternative specifications  Table 5: Instrumental variable analysis. Alternative specifications  Table 5: Instrumental variable analysis. Alternative specifications        
  Province fixed effects  LLM fixed effects  Mafia in neighbour 
municipalities 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












  Mafia  Public 
funds 
Mafia  Public 
funds 
Mafia  Public 
funds 
Mafia    1.308**    1.165**    1.260*** 
    (0.599)    (0.591)    (0.470) 
             
Mafia -             0.033 
neighbour            (0.125) 
             
Rainfall 1850-61  -0.014**    -0.027***    -0.019***   
  (0.006)    (0.008)    (0.005)   
             
Rainfall 1850-61  0.011**    0.022***    0.015***   
Squared  (0.005)    (0.007)    (0.004)   
             
Slope  -0.002***    -0.002*    -0.002***   
  (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
             
Altitude  -0.261***    -0.343***    -0.204***   
  (0.074)    (0.104)    (0.067)   
             
Population   0.221    0.178    0.233   
density 1861  (0.169)    (0.207)    (0.170)   
             
Test overid.  
P-value 
0.1381    0.1679    0.1798   
             
First stage F  6.43876    6.01082    10.9238   
Shea Par. R2  0.0932    0.0978    0.1415   
         
Observations    389    389    389 
All  regressions  include  population  density,  unemployment  rate,  social  capital  and  industry  share. 
Instrumented variable: mafia. Excluded instruments: Rainfall 1850-1861, Rainfall squared, population 
density in 1861, slope and altitude. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
6 6 6 6. . . .2 2 2 2       Alternative  Alternative  Alternative  Alternative measures of mafia measures of mafia measures of mafia measures of mafia       
In  this  section  we  present  two  alternative  measures  of  mafia.  First,  we  introduce  a 
narrow definition of the mafia dummy variable. The new dummy variable, mafia_narrow, 
takes the value 1 if a municipality experienced a mafia-type crime, as defined by the article 
416-bis  of  the  Penal  Code,  over  the  period  2004-2009.
11  Second,  we  replace  the  mafia 
                                                           
11  About  13.85%  of  municipalities  experienced  a  mafia-type  episode  as  defined  by  the  variable 
mafia_narrow in the period 2004-2009. 16 
 
indicator variable with the actual number of mafia-related episodes per capita according to 
the Art. 416-bis of the Penal Code.
12  
 
Table 6: Instrumental variable ana Table 6: Instrumental variable ana Table 6: Instrumental variable ana Table 6: Instrumental variable analysis. Alternative measures of mafia lysis. Alternative measures of mafia lysis. Alternative measures of mafia lysis. Alternative measures of mafia 
  Mafia narrow  Mafia per capita 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








  Mafia  Public funds  Number of   Public funds 
  narrow    mafia episodes   
         
Mafia -     1.522**     
narrow    (0.641)     
         
Number of         8.724** 
mafia episodes        (3.771) 
         
Rainfall 1850-61  -0.014***    -0.003**   
  (0.005)    (0.001)   
         
Rainfall 1850-61  0.011***    0.002**   
Squared  (0.004)    (0.001)   
         
Slope  -0.002***    -0.000*   
  (0.001)    (0.000)   
         
Altitude  -0.152**    -0.029*   
  (0.065)    (0.017)   
         
Population density  0.279    -0.003   
1861  (0.170)    (0.024)   
         
         
Test overid. restr. - p    0.1335    0.4052 
First stage F    8.35141    5.16197 
Shea Par. R2    0.1207    0.0529 
         
Observations    389    389 
All  regressions  include  population  density,  unemployment  rate,  social  capital  and  industry  share. 
Instrumented variable, column 2: Mafia-narrow. Instrumented variable, column 4: Number of mafia 
episodes.  Excluded  instruments:  Rainfall  1850-1861,  Rainfall  squared,  population  density  in  1861, 
slope and altitude. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Consistent  with  the  previous  results,  the  estimated  coefficient  on  mafia-narrow  is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Not just the presence of mafia, but also the number 
of mafia episodes significantly affects the amount of public funds. Although the instruments 
are weakened in this specification, they are still valid, as reported by the P-value of the test 
for overidentification restrictions.  
                                                           
12 On average, the number of mafia related episodes per capita is 0.02 per municipality, with the 
municipality Gurgio (Agrigento) experiencing the highest number of mafia-related episodes over the 
2004-2009 period. 17 
 
 
6 6 6 6. . . .3 3 3 3       Alternative  Alternative  Alternative  Alternative estimation methods estimation methods estimation methods estimation methods       
Next,  we  replicate  the  econometric  analysis  by  relying  on  two  different  estimation 
methods. Table 7 presents the new estimation results. Column 1 and 2 report the estimates 
for the GMM analysis. The estimated coefficient on mafia is close to the one presented in 
Table 4 and it is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
In the last two columns we take into account that our endogenous variable is binary, 
so estimating a probit first stage. Column 3 reports the results of the probit estimation of 
the first stage, while column 4 presents the second stage. The mafia variable is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 7: Alternative estimation methods Table 7: Alternative estimation methods Table 7: Alternative estimation methods Table 7: Alternative estimation methods 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  First stage  Second stage  First  
stage 
Second stage 
  Mafia  Public Funds  Mafia  Public Funds 
         
Mafia    1.287***    1.563*** 
    (0.468)    (0.251) 
         
Rainfall 1850-61  -0.019***    -0.032*   
  (0.005)    (0.019)   
         
Rainfall 1850-61  0.015***    0.025   
Squared  (0.004)    (0.016)   
         
Slope  -0.002***    -0.011***   
  (0.001)    (0.004)   
         
Altitude  -0.204***    -1.138**   
  (0.067)    (0.483)   
         
Population density  0.234    0.731**   
1861  (0.169)    (0.351)   
         
Estimation   GMM  Heckman selection  
method         
         
Test overid. restr. - p    0.1875     
First stage F    11.8269     
Shea Par. R2    0.1552     
         
Observations    389    389 
All regressions include population density,  unemployment rate, social capital  and 
industry share. Instrumented variable: mafia. Excluded instruments: Rainfall 1850-
1861,  Rainfall  squared,  population  density  in  1861,  slope  and  altitude.  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4  Coping with weak instruments Coping with weak instruments Coping with weak instruments Coping with weak instruments       
In this section we deal with the potential issue of weak instruments. Although the F-
test of exclusion restriction is always above the 10 cut-off value in the main specification 
(Table  4),  we  present  further  analysis  to  prove  the  robustness  of  our  results.  When 
instruments are weak, two major problems arise. First, 2SLS estimated standard errors are 
small and the width of confidence intervals is narrow. As a result, hypothesis testing based 
on 2SLS estimates is misleading. Second, the 2SLS estimator is consistent, but biased in 
finite samples.
13  
The first column deals with the issue of narrow confidence intervals and follows the 
conditional  likelihood  ratio  approach  developed  by  Moreira  (2003).  Moreira’s  conditional 
likelihood ratio test adjusts the critical values for hypothesis testing on the basis of the 
sample  employed  and  constructs  the  confidence  intervals.  The  bounds  of  our  confidence 
intervals  (CLRT  and  Anderson  Rubin)  presented  in  column  1  are  both  positive,  thus 
supporting our previous results.  
The second exercise in order to deal with weak instruments entails taking care of the 
biased estimates. The limited information maximum likelihood is a k-class estimator, which 
provides an unbiased median. Columns 2 to 4 present the results of the limited information 
maximum likelihood estimation for different Fuller values. The results confirm the positive 
impact of mafia on public funds. The estimated coefficient is slightly larger than the 2SLS 
estimate, thus indicating a greater impact of mafia on public funds, once we correct for the 
bias.  
 
Table 8: Coping with weak instruments Table 8: Coping with weak instruments Table 8: Coping with weak instruments Table 8: Coping with weak instruments       
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  CLRT  Fuller1  Fuller2  Fuller3  Fuller4 
  Public Funds 
           
Mafia  1.292***  1.382***  1.358***  1.335***  1.312*** 
  (0.462)  (0.534)  (0.525)  (0.517)  (0.508) 
           
Confidence set           
Conditional LR  [0.501, 2.528]         
           
Anderson- Rubin  [0.302, 2.850]         
           
Observations  389  389  389  389  389 
All regressions include population density, unemployment rate, social capital and industry share. Instrumented 
variable: Mafia. Excluded instruments: Rainfall 1850-1861, Rainfall squared, population density in 1861, slope 
and altitude. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
       
                                                           
13 For a review of the literature coping with weak instruments, see Murray (2006).  19 
 
7. 7. 7. 7. Interpreting the results.  Interpreting the results.  Interpreting the results.  Interpreting the results.        
This section presents further evidence on the interpretation of the results. First, we test 
whether  the  positive  relationship  between  mafia  and  public  transfers  is  due  to  a  more 
generous attitude of the State towards municipalities with mafia presence. Second, we test 
whether crime culture, rather than mafia, has an effect on funds’ allocation. Finally, we 
provide  evidence  that  investment  is  more  likely  to  be  unproductive  and  public  sector 
corruption to be greater in municipalities where mafia is present.  
 
7.1 Two competing scenarios 7.1 Two competing scenarios 7.1 Two competing scenarios 7.1 Two competing scenarios       
So far, we have shown that mafia has a positive and robust causal impact on public 
funds allocation. However, this finding can be explained according to two different stories. In 
the first scenario, the State indirectly opposes mafia by boosting employment opportunities 
through the allocation of funding to firms located in mafia-ridden areas. According to the 
second  scenario,  the  State  offers  investment  subsidies  for  general  economic  development 
purposes. However, mafia-connected firms intercept part of these transfers and pocket the 
funds. In the rest of this subsection we disentangle these two interpretations and provide 
direct evidence in favour of the second scenario.  
If the first scenario is valid, then it is reasonable to assume that the State tends to 
contrast organized crime also with other forms of public spending. Luckily, we can test this 
hypothesis. We consider public expenditure at municipality level on a set of other items, 
such as expenditure on culture, nursery services, primary school and lower-secondary school, 
divided by the corresponding population.
14 We conduct an instrumental variable analysis as 
in Table 4, where the dependent variable is one of the four expenditure items listed above. 
Table 9 reports the estimation results. The estimated impact of mafia on expenditure on 
culture, nursery services and lower secondary school is not statistically significant, while it is 
negative  and  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level  on  primary  school.  These  results 
contradict the view that the State is more likely to be generous towards municipalities where 
mafia is present. If anything, these municipalities seem to be underfunded, as in the case of 
the primary school expenditure, relative to municipalities where mafia is absent.  
   
                                                           
14 Only a small set of expenditure items are available at municipality level. For example, expenditure 
on education above the lower-secondary level is only available at a more aggregate locality level.  20 
 
Table 9: Falsifi Table 9: Falsifi Table 9: Falsifi Table 9: Falsification tests cation tests cation tests cation tests 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Culture  Nursery 
services 
Primary school  Lower-
secondary 
school 
         
Mafia  -10.293  -127.559  -234.327***  14.018 
  (8.343)  (137.155)  (76.218)  (44.264) 
         
Test overid. restr. 
— p 
0.5119  0.3716  0.1676  0.4092 
First stage F  11.8269  11.8269  11.8269  11.8269 
Shea Par. R2  0.1552  0.1552  0.1552  0.1552 
Observations  389  389  389  389 
All regressions include population density, unemployment rate, social capital and 
industry  share.  Instrumented  variable:  mafia.  Excluded  instruments:  Rainfall 
1850-1861,  Rainfall  squared,  population  density  in  1861,  slope  and  altitude. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
7.2 Mafia or crime culture? 7.2 Mafia or crime culture? 7.2 Mafia or crime culture? 7.2 Mafia or crime culture?       
Having ruled out this alternative scenario, we further investigate the role of mafia in 
attracting public transfers. We question whether we are capturing the impact of mafia on 
transfers’ allocation or whether we are capturing the impact of crime in general, which is 
suspected to be highly correlated with mafia. In other words, is it mafia or crime culture? 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 10 present a simple exercise. We replicate the basic specification 
of Table 4 for a new measure of crime. Instead of looking at mafia, we consider the number 
of other types of crime committed at municipality level, namely manslaughter, involuntary 
manslaughter  and  infanticide.
15  The  new  crime  variable  does  not  have  any  statistically 
significant impact on public transfers either in the OLS estimation (column 1), or in the 
2SLS estimation (column 2). Therefore, we can exclude that the crime culture can affect the 
amount of funding assigned to municipalities. 
   
                                                           
15 Articles 578, 589, 584 of the Italian Penal Code. 21 
 
Table 10: Public funds and crime culture Table 10: Public funds and crime culture Table 10: Public funds and crime culture Table 10: Public funds and crime culture 
  (1)  (2) 
  Public Funds 
     
Other Crime  0.067  0.069 
  (0.105)  (1.012) 
     
Estimation method  OLS  2SLS 
     
Test overid. restr. - p    0.0051 
First stage F    3.52344 
Shea Par. R2    0.0184 
R
2  0.0688   
Observations  389  389 
All regressions include population density, unemployment rate, social capital 
and industry share. Column 2, instrumented variable: Other crime. Column 
2,  excluded  instruments:  Rainfall  1850-1861,  Rainfall  squared,  population 
density in 1861, slope and altitude. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
7.3 Unproductive allocation? 7.3 Unproductive allocation? 7.3 Unproductive allocation? 7.3 Unproductive allocation?       
Does it matter if funds’ allocation is positively related to mafia? In the analysis we 
have conducted so far, we have implicitly assumed that mafia’s effect on funds’ allocation 
reduces productivity and that investment is more likely to be unproductive where mafia is 
present. This subsection provides indirect and direct evidence that this is indeed the case. 
Let us consider the indirect evidence. First, there is a large consensus about the inefficacy of 
Law  488/92.  Bronzini  and  de  Blasio  (2006)  apply  a  rigorous  counterfactual  evaluation 
framework to show that these subsidies did not generate additional investments. The authors 
show that financed firms simply brought forward investment projects originally planned for 
the  post-intervention  period  to  take  advantage  of  the  incentives.  Overall,  the  authors 
conclude that their exercise “cast[s] some doubts on the efficacy of Law 488.” Bernini and 
Pellegrini  (2011)  support  these  findings  by  demonstrating  that  Law  488-subsidized  firms 
show a smaller increase in TFP than non-subsidized firms. In the policy arena, Rossi (2006) 
asserts  that  government  spending  in  the  Italian  South  has  been  widely  associated  with 
corruption.
16 We hypothesize that mafia averts public funds, which are then diverted to less 
productive activities or that end up in the hands of mafia directly. Although we cannot show 
how these funds are actually used, we can however show the causal link between mafia and 
corruption in the public administration. Empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis is 
                                                           
16 Some relevant journalistic inquiries further support the idea that many corruption episodes featured 




presented in Table 11. The dependent variable is the number of public sector corruption 
events per capita, at municipality level, according to the Italian Penal Code.
17 In the 2SLS 
specification shown in column 1, mafia has a positive and statistically significant impact on 
the  measure  of  public  officials’  corruption.  This  finding  provides  direct  evidence  of  the 
negative impact of mafia on public administration’s functioning and its long arm in the 
public sector.  
Law 488 assigns public transfers directly to firms. The evidence shown so far sheds 
light on the link between mafia and public transfers’ allocation. Column 2 provides evidence 
of the missing link between mafia and firms. The dependent variable is the number of firms 
seized by Italian police due to links to organized crime.
18 Using the 2SLS estimation, we 
provide evidence of the causal relationship between mafia presence and the number of firms 
seized in each municipality.  
 
Table 11: Mafia and corruption Table 11: Mafia and corruption Table 11: Mafia and corruption Table 11: Mafia and corruption 
  (1)  (2) 
  Corruption per 
capita 
Seized firms 
     
Mafia  0.072*  0.541*** 
  (0.041)  (0.144) 
     
Test overid. restr. - p  0.1484  0.2034 
First stage F  11.8269  11.8269 
Shea Par. R2  0.1552  0.1552 
Observations  389  389 
     
All  regressions  include  population  density,  unemployment  rate, 
social  capital  and  industry  share.  Instrumented  variable:  mafia. 
Excluded  instruments:  Rainfall  1850-1861,  Rainfall  squared, 
population  density  in  1861,  slope  and  altitude.  Robust  standard 
errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
8. 8. 8. 8. Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions       
An  emerging  literature  has  focused  on  the  economic  impact  of  organized  crime  on 
economic outcomes. We contribute to this literature by uncovering one of the mechanisms 
through which organized crime affects the economy. We provide evidence that organized 
crime can affect the allocation of public funds. Using an innovative dataset on crime and a 
pioneering  set  of  instruments  for  mafia,  we  provide  evidence  that  mafia  influences  the 
                                                           
17 Articles 246, 314, 317, 318, 322, 323, 479, 480, 481, 319, 493, 319 ter, 320, 322 bis, 316.  
18 Source: Agenzia Nazionale per l’amministrazione e la destinazione dei beni sequestrati e confiscati 
alla criminalita’ organizzata (2009).  23 
 
allocation of public funds. According to our estimate, organized crime increases the total 
amounts of funds by about 35% on average. By manipulating the assignment of public funds 
allocated to lagging areas, organized crime effectively undermines growth, investment and 
development.  
Our  results  have  an  important  policy  implication  with  respect  to  the  design  of 
geographically targeted aid policies. Such policies are very relevant both in developed and in 
developing countries. As far as the presence of crime is higher in lagging targeted areas, as it 
is likely the case, funding policies should take into account the risk the at least part of the 
money  feeds  organized  crime.  The  results  of  this  study  suggest  that  policies  based  on 
monetary incentives should be at least accompanied by actions aimed at contrasting crime.  
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